I am not saying that David’s Lublin’s piece today (AutopsyPart III) is hack-work, but he misses some important points.
His section on the “over-reliance on Republican racism” in
particular is off-the-mark. Governor
Hogan’s positioning wasn’t designed so much to appeal to Black voters, but to persuade
white voters that a vote for Hogan wasn’t a vote for a racist.
Let me walk through this line of thinking for a moment. There are certain topics that don’t register
as highly salient on standard survey questions (such as: “What is the most important
problem facing the United States/Maryland/your local community at the present
time?”). Abortion usually polls in the
single-digits on such open-ended issue questions. However, whether a candidate is pro-choice or
pro-life is like oxygen for many voters…the absence of the “correct position”
is instantly disqualifying.
A similar dynamic is at play when it comes to race. Now, white voters may be reluctant to support
a racist candidate or, and this is a critical difference, they may say
they are disinclined to back a racist candidate…but end up voting for them
anyway (see: Helms, Jesse; Gantt, Harvey; North Carolina; 1990). But if a GOP candidate positions themselves
as “good” or at least “neutral” (as if there is such a thing) on race, they can
assuage the fears of white voters who would be mightily offended if they were
called racist.
Hogan did a good job insulating himself from most charges of
racism. One could argue that several of Hogan’s actions were grounded in racist
beliefs and/or supported by racists…the cancellation of the Red Line and how he
handled issues pertaining to Baltimore City schools leap to mind. In both cases, Hogan’s position was in line
with not only the vast majority of Republican voters…but also a sizable
percentage of white independents and Democrats.
It was this sort of broad appeal, combined with a “nice guy” image of a
Governor (who is, by the by, married to an Asian woman and who also picked a
Black Lieutenant Governor) that helped convince voters, mostly white voters, that it
would be “OK” to cast a ballot for Hogan since Hogan "must be" "OK" on race...
Hogan’s campaign was also in a position where they largely
didn’t have to go negative against the Democratic nominee, Ben Jealous. They
(and some independent expenditure groups) did, but not enough to rankle most
Black voters and white moderates. So
this allowed Hogan to maintain his “good guy who would not exploit racial fears”
image.
And this is the other side of the equation, if Jealous were white
yet an insurgent (such as Bernie Sanders) – I believe his campaign would have been better
funded. If Jealous was Black and “establishment”
– his campaign would have had more resources.
Being both Black and an insurgent is a key point of differentiation. Lublin brought up Abrams and Gillum. Abrams was a progressive, yet establishment,
candidate who crushed her primary opponent by a 76% - 24% margin. Andrew Gillum
was a progressive, yet establishment, candidate who faced off against 2 1/2
serious and 3 1/2 minor challengers.
Jealous was painted, by some, as some sort of Black Radical Socialist
(which considering his establishment credentials with the NAACP and as a venture
capitalist would have been a laughable communications frame had it not been so
effective). Jealous also faced off
against several worthy opponents in the primary…and some seemed to be giving
somewhat less than their best when the General Election rolled around. Whereas
the Democratic parties in their respective states rallied around both Gillum and Abrams,
the consolidation of support in Maryland seemed less than total in the case of
Jealous. This was reflected in both the
public surveys as well as in the campaign finance numbers.
As a popular incumbent governing at a time when the economy
was perceived to be good and enjoying large leads in the polls and in
fundraising, Hogan never needed to do anything that might damage his “not a
racist” image. Did this help Hogan with
some Black voters? I would not be surprised if post-Election polls showed Hogan
garnering 15% of the Black vote, and perhaps something closer to 20% among
affluent Black voters, but I would argue that Hogan’s primary focus was on
making sure that he didn’t lose support among white moderates. And by being seen as not a racist, he removed
an obstacle that helped ensure that such white voters would not take a good
look at Jealous, even if they were more closely aligned with Jealous on an array of
public policy matters.
Finally, I believe that Jealous’ loss had far more to do
with his campaign’s lack of financial resources than his platform. Had the Establishment lined up for Jealous,
as they did for Brown, in this election cycle, he would have had the ability to
project his message far more effectively across the state. Would it have been enough to win? Who knows.
But by Jealous not being able to convey his narrative, Hogan dominated
the conversation in the closing weeks of the campaign, which undoubtedly contributed
to his margin of victory. We need to
consider why that fundraising disparity existed and for Lublin to brush off the “progressives
vs. the establishment” tension as “a bunch of hooey” is, quite simply, nonsense.
In solidarity.
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